>a subjective experience is called qualia
i dont think you understand what dennett is saying, however i can not fault you because most people don't. actually for a long time, i just thought he was just speaking nonsense till i heard an illusionist explain their position. needless to say, the whole "qualia doesn't exist" shtick is very misleading. what they mean is that they have problems with at least one of the following statements in this very specific list of ideas about it (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia#Definitions):
1. ineffable – they cannot be communicated, or apprehended by any means other than direct experience.
2. intrinsic – they are non-relational properties, which do not change depending on the experience's relation to other things.
3. private – all interpersonal comparisons of qualia are systematically impossible.
4. directly or immediately apprehensible by consciousness – to experience a quale is to know one experiences a quale, and to know all there is to know about that quale.
note that this definition is not even accepted by all non-materialists
. there are even plenty of idealists (such as hegel, and likely the british idealists) who do not accept (2) because they think all qualities are relational. for hegelians, qualia like redness are concrete universals... why is this important? because since people like dennett don't agree with this definition, they want to throw the whole concept away
>'give her the d'
this is a weird example. please explain what you meant
>because that knowledge(subjective experience ie. qualia) doesnt exist
there are some materialists who actually say that this knowledge does exist, but they bring up the ability hypothesis (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/#NoPropKnow1AbilHypo).
i do think there is some truth to this idea, but i feel as though they lack the proper metaphysics to understand why
>you cant just redefine words
idk why you think this. it is a very common thing people do in conceptual analysis. if our concepts are bad, we probably need to define new words or use old words in new ways. an example of this is with continuity. mathematicians have defined the concept of continuity around open sets and limits. bergson meanwhile believed that such a definition is unable to properly capture temporal continuity. this lead him to give a new definition of it. in the process of doing this, he also ended up using the term "duration" in a different way as a contrasting term between his theory of time, and the physicist's understanding of time based on abstract mathematical continuity. this is fine as long as people are explicit about using their terms in a different way
the brain dimensions thing doesn't really imply a nonphysical "dimension", unless you are reifying the structure of the brain like an aristotilean
>so your knowledge about someone(obtained truth of x) is as much a part of you as it is of them(truth of x)
i am guessing what you mean by this is an externalist theory of truth. i dont think this is a view that only dualists have though, nor is it a view that all dualists have
i don't think externalism permits the idea that the material and immaterial are completely unrelated. from what you have said, it follows that the knowledge of a thing is as much a part of you as of the thing. but this implies that it is possible that the thing is contained within the mind. the conclusion of this would be something like idealism, not dualism... note that as i have pointed out earlier, idealism does not mean that there are no external objects btw